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Abstract. US excise tax rates are state interdependent. For example, a one-cent increase 
in the cigarette tax rate implies a contemporaneous cigarette tax increase of 0.18 cents in 
the neighboring state, while in the case of gasoline taxation the reaction to the same rise is 
just 0.11 cents. However, identifying the source of this interaction is key to its normative 
assessment. Our empirical analysis – spanning the period 1992 to 2006 – finds that 
interdependence in the case of gasoline taxation is driven just by the (fear of) base 
mobility. By contrast, in the case of cigarette taxation, it is politically driven: only states 
with non-term limited governors react (providing evidence of yardstick competition), 
especially as the election year approaches. Additionally, cigarette taxes tend to be lower 
when the election year approaches, but again only under non-term limited governors, 
while the existence of smokers in the state tends to reduce the level of cigarette taxation 
independently of the electoral cycle and of the presence of a term limited governor. 
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& IEB.  1. Introduction 
 
 
There can be little doubt that US excise tax rates are state interdependent (Hunter and 
Nelson, 1992; Nelson, 2002; Rork, 2003; Egger, Pfaffermayr and Winer, 2005; 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2007; Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg, 2010; Esteller 
and Rizzo, 2011). All previous studies, despite obvious differences in their empirical 
analyses, report a positive tax reaction to neighbors’ tax rates and, implicitly or 
explicitly, argue that such a response is caused by strategic tax competition attributable 
to cross-border shopping, smuggling or both. In this paper we examine taxes on 
cigarettes and gasoline in the US and explicitly test for the source of horizontal 
interdependence.  
 
Brueckner (2003) describes two sources of strategic interaction among governments, 
captured in the resource-flow and spillover models respectively. The former stresses the 
role of tax base mobility, while the latter points to the possibility of information spilling 
over among interested voters in different jurisdictions (Salmon, 1987). Unfortunately, it 
is difficult in practice to disentangle one source from the other, as both models make the 
same empirical prediction, namely that tax rates should be interdependent among sub-
central governments. In the case of tax competition, tax base mobility (in our case, 
through cross-border shopping and/or smuggling) is required; in the case of yardstick 
competition, it is assumed that voters assess the relative performance of their respective 
governments and compare it with that of comparable governments when deciding who 
to cast their vote for. Thus, for this accountability mechanism to work, fiscal 
information must be readily available to voters. In any case, from a normative point of 
view, the cause of interdependence is not trivial. While yardstick tax competition 
improves political accountability; interdependence due to mobility of tax bases 
generates inefficiently low tax rates and hence the underprovision of public goods and 
services due to a race-to-the-bottom (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski,1986).
1 
 
As Wilson and Wildasin (2004) conclude, “More work is needed to incorporate 
reasonable political processes into tax competition models, leading to sharper empirical 
                                                 
1 Obviously, this conclusion holds under a benevolent government. If not the size of the public sector 
tends to be excessive from a normative point of view – i.e., Leviathan behavior (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980) – and this prescription is reversed, that is, tax competition would be welcomed.    1
distinctions between good and bad tax competition.” (p. 1088). In our case, this is 
necessary for the very empirical identification strategy of the source of tax 
interdependence, since “…, the crucial point about testing yardstick competition theory 
is not about local tax setting behavior as such, but in tax setting as linked to the 
incentives and constraints that are generated by the local electoral system” (Bordignon, 
Cerniglia and Revelli, 2004, p. 332). Thus, our empirical approach is firmly rooted in 
the US political process at the state level. 
 
In order to disentangle tax competition from that of yardstick, we proceed in line with 
the seminal papers by Case (1993) and Besley and Case (1995a). First, we distinguish 
those states run by a governor who is ineligible to run for reelection (because of a term 
limit) from all other states. We test their differential reaction for cigarette and gasoline 
taxes for a panel dataset running from 1992 to 2006. In the case of cigarette taxation, we 
find that only those states with governors who are not lame ducks set their tax rates by 
taking into account the rates levied by comparable jurisdictions - which, in keeping with 
the literature, we shall identify from this point on as the geographically contiguous 
states - while the other states do not react. Specifically, in the case of governors not 
approaching the end of their tenure, a one-cent increase in the real cigarette tax rate of 
their neighbors implies a contemporaneous cigarette tax increase of 0.18 cents. In 
contrast, the reaction in gasoline taxation is not politically driven, as long as it remains 
independent of the presence of a term limit. In this case the reaction is just 0.11 cents.  
 
These results are confirmed when we expand our analysis of the political process to take 
into account the impact of the election year (see, for example, Solé-Ollé, 2003; Bartolini 
and Santolini, 2011). In particular, independently of their neighbors’ tax policies, non-
term limited governors tend to lower cigarette taxation as the election year approaches 
(Besley and Case, 1995b, 2003),
2 while their reaction to what their neighbors do is also 
greatest as election year approaches. These two additional results – which do not hold 
for gasoline taxation – reinforce the fact that cigarette tax interdependence is driven by a 
political process and – in contrast with what the literature has suggested –
interdependence is due to yardstick competition. 
                                                 
2 In fact, Besley and Case (1995b) initially reported this finding, though it was not confirmed by their 
2003 paper. Alternatively, Johnson and Crain (2004) also found such a fiscal cycle reflecting term limits 
in an international sample.    2
A further interesting strand in the literature emphasizes the fact that “polluters” (in our 
case, drivers and smokers) are prone to excise “tax exploitation” by the majority. This is 
based on the more general concept proposed by Buchanan (1976) of “fiscal 
exploitation”. As Hunter and Nelson (1990) argue: “Excise taxes by virtue of their 
narrow bases provide perhaps the best opportunity for shifting the cost of the public 
sector onto a select group of individuals” (p. 268).
3 The empirical hypothesis – which 
was confirmed by these authors for cigarette taxation – is that political support for an 
excise tax rises as the proportion of the population consuming the base falls. In our case, 
this hypothesis holds only for cigarettes, while in the case of gasoline we obtain weak 
evidence of just the opposite. This might be seen, therefore, as additional evidence of 
the fact that cigarette taxation is politically motivated.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the section that follows, we provide a 
summary of the empirical literature on tax interdependence, focusing on yardstick 
competition and on the analyses carried out for US excise taxation. In section three, we 
present our empirical analysis and in section four we present and discuss our results. 
Finally, we conclude. 
 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
Salmon (1987) was the first author to recognize that comparative performance 
constituted a potential source of fiscal interdependence among sub-national 
governments. In his words, “each government has an incentive to do better than 
governments in other jurisdictions in terms of levels and qualities of services, of levels 
of taxes or of more general economic and social indicators” (p. 32). Subsequently, 
Besley and Case (1995a) developed a sophisticated information externality model 
among jurisdictions. The model implies that voters draw on relevant information from 
comparable jurisdictions in order to infer fiscal information that is fundamental in 
helping them make their next voting decision. Should this indeed be the case, then 
politicians need to be well aware of what their comparable jurisdictions are doing if they 
wish to ensure their own reelection for a further term.  
                                                 
3 See also Alesina and Passarelli (2010) who, following this line of reasoning, attempt to justify within a 
political economy framework the instruments (including taxes) that might be chosen to fight against 
negative externalities.   3
Besley and Case (1995a) tested this hypothesis by comparing the tax-setting decisions 
of those governors that could be reelected with the rates chosen by those who could not. 
They tested it both for state income-tax liability and for an amalgam of state taxes 
(sales, income and corporate income), and in both cases found that lame duck governors 
did not make tax changes that were dependent on their neighbors’ rates, which was very 
much in contrast with the performance of the rest of the state governors. If tax 
competition were the cause of tax interdependence, then the reaction should have been 
independent of whether governors could be held accountable (no term limit) or not 
(binding term limit). For this reason, the authors conclude that the tax interdependence 
found was due solely to yardstick competition. In more recent studies, this source of tax 
interdependence has also been found by Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Solé-
Ollé (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005) and more recently by Bartolini and Santolini 
(2011). All of which were undertaken with local governments in various countries with 
a primary focus on property taxation. 
 
As we argued in the Introduction, in the case of excise taxation, there is considerable 
empirical evidence of tax interdependence for the US case. However, as a result no 
doubt of the extensive anecdotic evidence that cross-border shopping, and even 
smuggling, are very important in certain areas,
4 authors have tended not to devote much 
time in attempting to disentangle the most likely source of this interdependence.  
 
Rork (2003) reported a horizontal reaction of 0.636 and 0.6 cents for cigarette and 
gasoline, respectively. He measured each tax in (real) cents, and attributed all the 
reaction to tax base mobility. Egger, Pfaffermayr and Winner (2005) obtained reactions 
as high as 0.9 and 0.898 cents for gasoline and cigarettes, respectively.
5 Devereux, 
Lockwood and Redoano (2007), Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg (2010) and Esteller and 
                                                 
4 For example, Fleenor (1998) finds that smuggling and cross-border sales account for 7.8% and 3.6% of 
final sales in the US; while Thursby and Thursby (2000) suggest that commercial smuggling accounted 
for about one-third of the revenue loss from inter-state transactions. 
 
5 It is difficult to reconcile the value of these reactions with the observed tax differentials among US 
states. For example, in our sample the coefficient of variation of real excise tax rates (for the pool of 
states for 1992-2006) is 75% and 25% for cigarettes and gasoline, respectively. In fact, Keen (2002) 
argues that this is a striking observation, as the presence and/or fear of cross-border shopping and/or 
smuggling would suggest much less variation. In any case, if reactions were closer to 1, tax rate 
differentials would tend to vanish over time, which does not seem to be the case (for cigarettes, the 
coefficient of variation in 1992 was 44%, while in 2006 it was 66%, and for gasoline the coefficient was 
21% and 25%, respectively).    4
Rizzo (2011) included the lagged endogenous variable with the result that the estimate 
of the horizontal reaction was then considerably lower.
6  The former obtained a reaction 
of 0.277 and 0.191 (though, statistically insignificant) for cigarette and gasoline 
taxation, respectively, while the latter - deflating unit excise tax rates by means of a 
state price index - obtained a reaction of  0.22 and 0.12 (both statistically significant), 
respectively. Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg (2010) define the tax rate variable as an 
“average effective tax rate”, which is an average of the state sales tax and specific tax 
rates.
7 In their case, and although not fully comparable with the previous two results, the 
reaction they estimate is around 0.4.  
 
While Jacobs, Ligthart and Vrijburg (2010) and Esteller and Rizzo (2011) are silent 
regarding the source of tax interdependence, Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2007) 
suggest that their results point to tax competition as being the most likely source, since 
in their spatial lag model the average of all other state taxes is not statistically 
significant while the tax average constructed using neighbor weights works better. 
However, note that their conclusions might be somewhat hastily drawn, as information 
externalities are usually thought to flow more easily between neighboring jurisdictions 
(Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995a).  
 
In contrast with these previous studies, and now that the presence of tax interaction is 
well documented, we aim at identifying the source of this interdependence.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Empirical framework 
 
In order to test for the source of horizontal tax interaction in the US, we estimate the tax 
reaction function by relating one state tax to the average tax in its neighboring states for 
the period 1992-2006. We repeat this procedure for gasoline and cigarette taxes 
transformed into real terms (using the federal Consumer Price Index). We proceed 
                                                 
6 If state taxes are serially correlated, the estimates of horizontal interdependence obtained without 
controlling for the lagged endogenous variable are probably upwardly biased. 
 
7 Undoubtedly, this is an interesting approach. However, note that by adopting it we cannot identify how 
states react to the tax changes made by their neighbors, that is, by either varying the excise tax rate and/or 
by varying the general sales tax rate.   5
parsimoniously, and so first estimate a static tax reaction function (section 3.1.1). Next, 
we estimate a dynamic function, having first recognized the potential presence of inertia 
in excise taxation (section 3.1.2). 
 
3.1.1. Static function  
 
In order to estimate the potentially different reactions of states depending on whether 
their governor is or is not able to stand for reelection, we estimate the following 
equation:  
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where  jst t  is the real tax rate on commodity j for state s in year t;  s  is a state fixed 
effect;  t   is a year effect; 
s i
jst sit w  is the average real tax rate for commodity j of the 
neighboring states of state s in year t, where si w are identical exogenous weights, 




si 1  , which accounts for the relative interdependence relation 
between s and the rest of the i-states; the variable Term_limitst takes the value 1 for 
those states whose governor cannot stand for re-election (i.e., lame duck 
governor); jst X is a vector of state-specific time-varying regressors; while jst   is a mean 
zero, normally distributed random error. Thus, in the case of a state with a non-term 
limited governor its reaction to a one-cent increase in the average real tax rate of its 
neighbors is  1  cents, while if the governor is term limited, it is  1  + 2  cents. 
 
Then, from the estimation of the above expression, we can reasonably expect to obtain 
one of the following cases for each tax: 
 
(i) 0 1   and  0 2   : there is horizontal interdependence, and this does not significantly 
differ according to whether the governor is term limited or not, so the source of 
interaction is (the fear of) cross-border shopping and/or smuggling, that is, tax   6
competition due to base mobility. 
 
(ii)  0 1   and 0 2   : again, there is horizontal interdependence (i.e.,  0 1   ), but if 
0 2 1    , only yardstick competition plays a role, while if  0 2 1    , tax and 
yardstick competition both play a role. Whatever the case, term limited governors tend 
to react less, that is,  0 2   . 
 
(iii) 0 1    and 0 2   : there is no horizontal interdependence. According to section 2, 
this would be at odds with the previous literature.  
 
Therefore, the estimate of  2  is basic for our identification strategy of the source of 
horizontal tax interdependence. Additionally, we would expect the level of taxation to 
be relatively higher if the state was governed by a term limited governor, that is,  0    
(Besley and Case, 1995b) 
 
As for econometric issues, note the mean neighboring tax rate,
s i
jst sit w , is endogenous 
because it can be influenced simultaneously by the tax rate that we are estimating. Then, 
if this was a structural model, a simple OLS estimation of [1] would suffer from 
endogeneity bias: the error term εjst would be correlated with the error terms of the other 
simultaneous equations in the system. In order to overcome the simultaneity bias, we 
use the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method: first, we estimate the reduced forms of 
the endogenous variables, and then we substitute their fitted values into [1]. The 
residuals of this last equation are corrected using the actual values of the endogenous 
variables. We instrument the mean neighboring tax rate with all the neighboring 
exogenous variables. In the case of the spatial lag that is interacted with the term limit, 
the instruments are the same albeit interacted with the neighbors’ variable term limit.  
 
In order to isolate the independent impact of the average tax rate of the neighboring 
states, we include other variables that might affect the state tax rate and which must be 
taken into account in order to avoid biased estimates. These variables are included in the 
vector jst X . Specifically, state taxation may be influenced by the economic, 
demographic and political environment. Details of these variables are given in section   7
3.2.3, but note we also include a variable that captures  the importance of polluters as a 
minority group in the state (in line with the arguments advanced in the Introduction 
based on the “tax exploitation” hypothesis). This variable will be lagged one period to 
avoid reverse causality: while we seek to estimate the impact of polluters on taxes, taxes 
will also have an impact on the number of polluters. 
 
Certain invariable state characteristics are likely to affect its tax system, such as climate 
or geography, among others. We take these characteristics into account by including a 
dichotomous variable for each state. Changes in the macroeconomic situation may also 
affect a state’s fiscal policies, and so we include a set of time effects.
8  
 
3.1.2. Dynamic function  
 
Recent empirical papers dealing with horizontal fiscal interdependence recognize the 
possibility that reactions are not immediate. In order to account for this sluggishness, we 
amend expression [1] and include the lagged endogenous variable as an additional 
explanatory variable. This is what Anselin et al. (2007) call a “time-space 
simultaneous” model. Thus, the dynamic model we wish to estimate is as follows:  
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As long as 0   , we can conclude that when faced by a shock, taxes will show a certain 
degree of inertia (the higher the estimate of , the greater the degree of inertia) and so 
the new optimal level of the excise tax rate will be achieved in the long run.
9 Most 
importantly, the interpretation of the estimates of 1   and  2  is the same as that provided 
for the static version of the model. Likewise, the justification and the list of controls 
                                                 
8 In the dynamic version of the model (see next section), the inclusion of time effects also serves a useful 
technical purpose. In that version, we need to estimate the covariance matrix of the transformed errors, 
which is built on the assumption that errors are only correlated within but not across individuals. As such, 
the time effects serve to remove universal time-related shocks from the errors. 
 
9 Additionally, in order to avoid an explosive specification, and for the tax rate to be compatible with the 
concept of Nash equilibrium (see, for example, Lockwood and Migalli, 2008), which we implicitly 
employ, we also expect <1.   8
included in [2] are no different from those in expression [1].  
 
However, the estimation procedure is, since this specification is known to cause a bias 
due to the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the individual specific 
effects. This bias is especially serious for short panels like ours (Nickell, 1981). For this 
reason we employ the so-called system GMM dynamic panel estimator (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In fact, this estimator is an augmented version 
of the difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991), and is considered more efficient 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). Basically, these estimators mean, first, transforming the 
original model to a system that takes a first difference equation
10 and, second, 
instrumenting the lagged endogenous variable using lags that are two or more of the 
endogenous variable in levels (i.e.,  1     jst jst jst t t t  is instrumented using 
,... t , t , t jst jst jst 4 3 2    ). Unlike the difference GMM, which just employs the differences 
equation, the system GMM builds a stacked data set, one in levels and one in 
differences. Then, the differences equation is instrumented with levels, while the levels 
equation is instrumented with differences. 
 
Using all the available lags as instruments is efficient, but can cause severe downward 
bias in the GMM estimators because of the overfitting of instrumental variables if the 
sample is finite (Ziliak, 1997). For this reason, in line with Roodman (2009), we seek to 
keep the number of instruments below the number of groups or, in our case, states. In 
order to check instrument validity, we employ the standard Hansen test (whose null 
hypothesis states that the corresponding group of instruments is exogenous) but the 
power of which is seriously weakened if the number of instruments is especially high. 
 
In any case, the consistency of the GMM estimator crucially depends on the assumption 
that the error term, jst  , is serially uncorrelated. Otherwise some of our instruments will 
be invalidated. If there is no serial correlation in the jst  , first-differenced residuals 
should display first-order serial correlation, but not second-order serial correlation (i.e., 
0 2     ] , [ E jst jst   ). That is why we test for first (AR(1)) and second-order (AR(2)) 
                                                 
10 Our dynamic approach, which implies removing the fixed effects taking first differences, is also useful 
for overcoming the inconsistency of the estimates due to the “incidental parameters problem” for a fixed 
T as in our case (Neyman and Scott, 1948).   9
serial correlation, where the null hypothesis is the absence of serial correlation 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
 
To implement GMM we need to estimate the covariance matrix of the transformed 
errors. In a two-step system GMM, the standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-
specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and so the estimator is more efficient. 
The standard errors, though, are downward biased. In order to correct this bias we 
employ the correction procedure proposed by Windmeijer (2005). For comparative 
purposes, though, we also show the estimation results under a one-step system GMM. 
 
As discussed in section 3.1.1, the dynamic model we propose estimating includes a 
further endogenous variable, namely, the spatial lag. This can be instrumented as in the 
static version. We label these instruments “external”, in contrast with the “internal” 
instruments, which are the lags of the spatial lag. We make this differentiation because 
when T rises the instrument count can easily grow relative to the sample size, thereby  
causing the asymptotic properties of the estimators to be misleading (Roodman, 2008). 
Then, we need to check the extent to which our results are dependent on the use of both 
sets of instruments or just the “internal” one, which in fact forms the basis of the GMM 
estimator. 
 
Having accounted for the most important technical questions regarding the GMM 
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This should serve as additional evidence of the source of tax interdependence. That is, 
we estimate it as an additional step in our identification strategy. Ceteris paribus, we 
expect a greater reaction from the non-term limited incumbents as elections approach,   10
so 0 3   , and also a lower level of taxation when the election year approaches for non- 
term limited governors, that is,  0 2   . If these two hypotheses hold, we obtain 
evidence in favor of yardstick competition. In order to measure the impact of the 
election year, we include the pre-election year, given that for tax policy to have an 
impact on voting decisions it has to be set some time in advance.
11 
 
3. 2. Data 
3.2.1 Nominal tax rates 
 
Taxes on gasoline and cigarettes vary considerably across states. In 1992, for example, 
the tax on a pack of cigarettes ranged from 2 cents in North Carolina to 40 cents in 
Connecticut. In the same year, the tax on a gallon of gasoline ranged from 7.5 cents in 
Georgia to 22 cents in Connecticut and Washington. Thus, there is significant cross-
sectional variation.  
 
Individual state taxes on cigarettes also vary over time. For example, in North Carolina 
the tax rate varied between 2 and 5 cents in 1992, but reached 30 cents in 2005 and 35 
cents in 2006. Connecticut shows even greater variation, having increased its rate from 
40 to 45 cents in 1992, it subsequently raised it again to 47 cents in 1994, 50 in 1995, 
111 in 2002 and finally to 151 cents in 2003. Likewise, individual state taxes on 
gasoline show considerable variation over time. While Georgia maintained the same tax 
(7.5 cents) throughout the period studied here, the rate varied markedly in Connecticut 
and Washington. Connecticut increased its tax rate from 14 to 38 cents in 1997. This 
was followed by a reduction to 36 cents in 1998, 32 in 1999 and, finally, to 25 cents in 
2002. Washington set a tax rate of 22 cents in 1990 and 23 in 1991. The tax was then 
increased to 28 cents in 2004, 31 in 2005 and, finally, 34 cents in 2006.   
 
3.2.2 Description of the term limit variable 
 
The term limit is a dichotomous variable which is equal to 1 for all years corresponding 
to a lame duck governor’s last term. In our sample, it varies considerably across states 
and even over time. In fact, in our sample (see Table 1) there are states in which there is 
                                                 
11 We also employed the election year, but the estimate was not statistically significant.   11
no term limit on the governor’s election and states where the governor can be re-elected 
for a second term (two-term limit). In this latter case, if re-elected he/she is term limited. 
There is also the case of Utah (corresponding to two years in our sample) where the 
governor can be elected for three consecutive terms (three-term limit) and the case of 
Virginia where the governor can only stand for one term (one-term limit) and so he/she 
is always term limited.  
 
Additionally, some states in our sample have changed their legislation from a no-term 
limit to a two-term (RI) limit or from a one-term limit to a two-term limit (KY, MS). 
We exploit this variation (Besley and Case,1995b; List and Sturm, 2006) across states 
and over time in order to assess the potentially different performances of governors with 




3.2.3 The other variables  
 
The rest of the right-hand side variables in [1] and in [2], together with their definitions, 




We include a set of time-varying variables that characterize the states’ economic and 
demographic situation: the state population (POP), per capita state income (INC), the 
state unemployment rate (UNEMP), the proportion of individuals in the state who are 
aged between 5 and 17 (CHILD), and the proportion who are over 65 years of age 
(AGED). The states’ political environment can also affect fiscal outcomes. Therefore, 
we use a dummy variable that equals one if the governor is a Democrat (DEMGOV). 
We also account for the proportion of Democrats in the state Senate and in the House of 
Representatives (DEMSEN and DEMHOU, respectively). The cigarette and gasoline 
industries might affect the state tax rate by lobbying for the rates of their respective 
commodities (Dixit, 1996). Therefore, in order to control for the influence of lobbies, 
we include TOBINC (tobacco production per dollar of state income) and GASINC 
(gasoline production per dollar of state income). In line with the “tax exploitation”   12
hypothesis (Hunter and Nelson, 1990), we also include the percentage of “polluters”, 
which is proxied by the percentage of adult smokers (PREVALENCE) and by the ratio 
of licensed drivers to the total population (PCDRIVERS) for cigarette and gasoline 
taxation, respectively. Both variables are lagged one year to avoid reverse causality as 
discussed in section 3.1.1. The federal fiscal policy, other than commodity tax rates, 
may also affect state commodity tax rates. Thus, we control for per capita federal grants 
to the states (GRANTS). 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Source of identification: Term Limits 
 
Table 3 shows our results for the estimation of the tax reaction functions both on 
cigarettes and on gasoline. We take a static approach, that is, in response to any shock 
the tax levels immediately reach the new optimum. According to columns (1) and (5), 
there is a positive, statistically significant horizontal interdependence in cigarettes and 
gasoline, respectively. This is in line with results published elsewhere in the literature. 
However, the degree of interdependence is quite high, with the estimated reaction being 
much higher for gasoline (0.949 vs. 0.535).
12 This probably reflects the fact that we 
have not taken into account the inertia in the tax setting. This is especially relevant in 
unit excise taxes. Thus, the role of inertia is being picked up by the spatial lag. 
Whatever the case, our empirical aim is to infer the origin of tax interdependence, which 
is what we turn to next. 
 
According to column (3), we find strong evidence of yardstick competition in cigarettes, 
while column (7) suggests that this source of interdependence is not an issue for 
gasoline taxation. In the case of cigarettes, a state with a non-term limited governor 
would increase its tax by 0.556 in response to a one-cent tax increase in its neighboring 
states, while a state with a lame duck governor would increase the tax rate by just 0.295 
cents (i.e., 0.556-0.261, an estimate that is statistically significant at the 95% level). In 
                                                 
12 The most readily comparable results are those obtained by Rork (2003). As mentioned in Section 2, we 
obtained a reaction for cigarettes that is relatively similar to that reported in his paper - 0.636 (see Table 
2, column 1 of his paper), while we obtained a much higher reaction for gasoline - 0.6 (see Table 2, 
column 2 of his paper). Nevertheless, note the poor performance of the over-identifying test for all our 
regressions in the case of gasoline.      13
the case of gasoline, a state with a non-term limited governor would increase its tax by 
0.728 cents, while a state with a term limited governor would do so by 0.654 cents (also 
statistically significant at the 99% level). Hence, states with term limited governors tend 
to react less,
13 which perhaps reflects the fact that their governors do not need to build a 
reputation by means of setting taxes at the same level as those of their neighbors since 
they are unable to stand for reelection. However, the estimated reaction is only 
statistically different in the case of cigarette taxation. In this latter case, note that – 
where cross-border shopping is the alternative to comparative performance – taxes are 
interdependent as a result of both yardstick competition (47%, i.e., 0.261/0.556) and tax 
competition (53%, i.e., 0.295/0.556).  
 
In addition, we find that cigarette taxes are higher in states with a lame duck governor 
(see the Term_limit estimate in column (3)), which is in line with accepted theory, while 
there is no difference in the case of gasoline. In general, we can conclude that the 
political environment has a much greater impact on cigarette tax rates than it does on 
those of gasoline. The higher the percentage of Democrats in the lower (Demhou) and 
upper (Demsen) state houses, the higher the level of cigarette taxation, while Republican 
governors (Governor) tend to counterbalance this effect by lowering excise taxation. 
Only this latter variable is (weakly) significant – presenting a negative sign, but with a 
very modest impact – in the case of gasoline taxation. The signs of the variables 
designed to capture the impact of lobbies (Tobinc and Gasinc) are positive, which is at 
odds with our expectations. Finally, all these results do not depend on whether or not we 
take into account the role of “polluters” (Prevalence (-1) and Pcdrivers (-1); see 
columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)), while the estimates of this variable are not statistically 
significant for gasoline or for cigarette taxation and tend to show a positive sign, which 




                                                 
13 The exogeneity of the variable Term limit might be disputed on the grounds that  term limited 
governors could be more competent than non-term limited governors, assuming the latter are in their first 
term (see, for example, Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011). Hence, reelection (and thus the presence 
of a term limited governor) might be a function of taxes. Were this to be an issue, then the estimates of 
the particular performance of term limited governors would be biased. However, as Bordignon, Cerniglia 
and Revelli (2003) argue this would mean that our estimates can be safely interpretable as being at the 
lower boundary.    14
Tables 4a and 4b show the results for cigarettes when we explicitly acknowledge the 
possibility of inertia in tax setting
14. For this reason, in these regressions we include the 
lagged dependent variable. The results in the two tables are qualitatively identical, 
although the values of the estimates vary slightly. From this point onwards, we focus 
our comments on the two-step procedure (Table 4b). In column (1), the presence of tax 
interdependence is confirmed, although the estimate is now just 0.216. This value is 
even lower when we control for the role of minority groups (Prevalence (-1)), 0.183 
(column (2)). In fact, once we control for inertia, the role of minority groups presents 
the expected negative sign, in contrast with the sign in the static model. In the other 
models, the statistical significance and the sign of this variable remain unchanged. The 
political variables, though, become statistically insignificant, while the impact of 
lobbies (Tobinc) now shows the expected negative sign, although we cannot reject the 
possibility that its impact might be null. Thus, we can confirm the presence of 
horizontal interdependence, while today’s taxes are almost 90% of yesterday’s taxes, 
since the variation in real unit tax rates can lag far behind.  
 
The results shown in columns (1) and (2) have been obtained using both internal 
(lagged values of endogenous variables) and external (exogenous variables of 
neighboring jurisdictions) instruments. However, the results remain almost unchanged if 
we just employ the internal instruments (see columns (5) and (6)). In column (3), we 
test for the source of tax interdependence. Given we are using both internal and external 
instruments, there is the danger of overfitting (as the high value of the Hansen test tends 
to indicate ).
15 Whatever the case, the estimates tend to confirm the hypothesis of 
yardstick competition obtained previously under a static tax setting. In order to 
overcome any potential overfitting (i.e., number of instruments greater than number of 
groups) and to check the robustness of our result, in column (7) we carry out the same 
regression, but now using the internal instruments only. The yardstick competition 
hypothesis clearly holds. In fact, in contrast with the static analysis, there seems to be 
room solely for this source of horizontal interdependence. This result is independent of 
the inclusion of the variable Prevalence (-1) (columns (4) and (8), respectively). There 
                                                 
14 In all regressions both for cigarettes and gasoline, note that according to AR(1) and AR(2) tests first-
differenced residuals display a first-order serial correlation, but not a second-order serial correlation. 
 
15 In this case, the Hansen test is not robust, while the apparent bias of the interaction toward zero may 
indicate weak instrumentation.   15
is also weak evidence that taxes are higher if the state is ruled by a lame duck governor 





In the case of gasoline, state tax setting is not affected by the fact that the governor is a 
lame duck or not. This is demonstrated by means of Table 5a (one-step system GMM) 
and Table 5b (two-step system GMM). Here again we focus our analysis on Table 5b
16. 
We find evidence of horizontal interdependence, but at a much lower degree than when 
we did not control for inertia, and in all circumstances much lower than that recorded in 
the case of cigarette taxation (specifically, 0.106 vs. 0.183 according to column (2) of 
Table 5b and Table 4b, respectively). The degree of inertia is even higher in the case of 
gasoline taxation, which might explain the marked decrease in the value of the estimate 
of the spatial lag when we include the lagged endogenous variable (0.975 vs. 0.106, the 
first value being that shown in column (6) of Table 3). In general, political variables do 
not seem to play a role, especially when we control for “polluters”. In fact, this latter 
variable (Pcdrivers (-1)) shows a positive sign, which does not fit within a political 
economy framework. Whatever the case, as regards the source of interdependence, the 
dynamic analysis tends to confirm what we found previously when taking a static 
approach: there is no difference in the reaction of gasoline taxation depending on 






4.2. Source of identification: Term Limit and Electoral Year 
 
Testing whether the response to changes  in the  taxes of neighboring  jurisdictions  is 
                                                 
16 Although the empirical framework reported here is quite different and the panel is shorter, these results 
are almost identical to the dynamic estimation provided by Esteller and Rizzo (2011). In this previous 
paper the authors reported a reaction in the case of cigarette taxation of 0.219 (Table 5, column 5) and of 
0.117 for gasoline (Table 4, column 5), while – if we leave to one side the regressions that include the 
role of “polluters”, as this variable is not considered in Esteller and Rizzo (2011) – we now obtain 
reactions of  0.216 (Table 4b, column 1) and 0.118 (Table 5b, column 1), respectively.    16
greatest during the electoral year in the case of non-term limited governors could help 
us to further identify the political determinants of tax interdependence. This is shown in 
Table 6. Here, again we present our results following both the one-step and two-step 
system GMM estimation strategies and we find that the previous results are confirmed.  
 
If we focus on the two-step estimation for cigarettes (column (2)), the reaction of a non-
term limited governor during an electoral year is 0.559 (i.e., 0.0948+0.4639, which is 
statistically significant at the 99% level). Additionally, independently of the horizontal 
reaction, taxes tend to be lower when the electoral year approaches if the governor is 
non-term limited (-108.83 cents), and certain political variables tend to become 
statistically significant again. Specifically, lower houses dominated by Democrats tend 
to raise taxes, while the negative impact of a Republican governor is only statistically 
significant under the one-step estimation strategy. The impact of polluters (i.e., 
smokers) is again statistically significant, and with the expected negative sign within a 
political economy framework. All in all, this source of identification tends to enrich the 
previous results regarding cigarettes, but adds little or nothing to those regarding 
gasoline (see columns (3) and (4)).  
 
The setting of cigarette tax rates only becomes dependent on the policies carried out by 
neighboring states if the governor can stand for reelection. Hence, the accountability 
mechanism through comparative performance does hold in this case. In addition to the 
political economy motive affecting the setting of taxes, there is a further factor; 
specifically, states with non-term limited governors tend to decrease taxes when the 
electoral year approaches. Finally, independently of the presence of a term limit, 
smokers – either as a lobby group or as voters – tend to have a negative impact on the 
level of cigarette taxation. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
 
We estimate and characterize horizontal excise tax interdependence for the US case, 
specifically for gasoline and cigarette taxation. In carrying out the estimation, we 
employ both static and dynamic frameworks so as to allow for a sluggish reaction. 
Although both empirical frameworks offer the same qualitative results, the point   17
estimates make greater sense under the dynamic framework. Thus, within this latter 
framework, we find that the reaction in both taxes is relatively modest: in response to a 
one-cent tax increase in its neighboring states, a state increases its cigarette tax rate by 
0.18 cents and its gasoline tax rate by 0.11 cents. However, the origins of these two 
reactions – compatible with a very high degree of inertia in tax setting – are quite 
distinct. In cigarette taxation, horizontal tax interdependence is politically motivated, 
while in the case of gasoline taxation, politics plays no role. Therefore, here, we are able 
to shed light on the origin of horizontal tax interaction. On the basis of our analysis, we 
find the following contrast: yardstick competition operates in cigarette taxation
17 while 
tax competition operates in gasoline taxation.  
 
This result is robust to different specifications. The basic identification strategy has 
been to distinguish between the reactions of states with lame duck governors and those 
made by the rest. In the case of gasoline, all states react; in the case of cigarettes, only 
those with non-term limited governors do. The result for cigarettes should be welcome 
as long as the presence of yardstick competition can be considered to hold the executive 
accountable. This main result is enhanced when we test for a differential behavior 
according to the electoral cycle. Then, we find the political motivation is reinforced in 
the case of cigarette taxation: only non-term limited governors react, but only when 
state elections are on the horizon. In fact, not only do they tend to mimic their 
neighbors, but they also seem to cut taxes. All in all, from a normative point of view, it 
seems that the accountability mechanism through comparative performance is closely 
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Table 1: Term Limits for Governors by State (1992-2006)  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
States with no term limits: 
CT, ID (1), IL, IA, MA (2), MN, NH, NY, ND, TX, UT(3), VT, WA (4), WI 
 
States limiting governors to one term of office: 
VA 
 
States limiting governors to two terms of office: 
AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO,  DE, FL, GA, IN, LA, KS, MD, ME, MI, MO, MT,  NC, NE, 
NJ, NM, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, WV, WY 
 
 
State law changed from no term limit to a two-term limit: 
RI (1994) 
 
State law changed from one-term limit to a two-term limit: 
KY (1994), MS (1994) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: The year in brackets is the year in which the term limit legislation changed. (1) a two-term limit 
was passed in 1994, but  repealed in 2002; (2) Term limits were enacted  in 1994, but declared 
unconstitutional by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1997; (3) a three-term limit was passed in 1994, but 
repealed in 2003; (4) two-term limit in 1992, but declared unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme 
Court in 1998 
Source: List and Sturm (2006) and 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/States_with_gubernatorial_term_limits 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (1992-2006)*           
Variable   Obs  Mean   Stand. Dev.   Min  Max 
tg (state unit gasoline tax, cents*10 in real terms with CPI)  720  120.5  28.6  37.20  236.8 
tc (state unit cigarette tax, cents*10 in real terms with CPI)  720  269.6  215.3  13.59  1,302 
POP(state population*10
-6)  720  5.708  6.101  0.463  36.250 
INC (state income per capita*10
-2 in real terms with CPI)   720  158.3  25.4  104.3  251.8 
UNEMP (state unemployment rate)  720  5  1.331  2.3  11.3 
CHILD (proportion of population between 5 and 17)  720  0.186  0.014  0.157  0.259 
AGED (proportion of population over 65)  720  0.128  0.017  0.085  0.185 
TOBINC (tobacco production, thousand pounds per dollar of state income*10
-1 in real terms with CPI) 
720  17.567  62.192  0  483.9 
GASINC (daily gasoline production, thousand barrels per day, per dollar of state income in real terms with 
CPI)  720  0.493  1.467  0  13.106 
GRANTS (federal grants per capita *10
-2 in dollars in real terms with CPI)  720  6.82  2.51  3.10  27.40 
DEMGOV (=1 if the governor is a Democrat)  720  0.537  0.499  0  1 
TERMLIMIT (=1 when the governor is a lame duck)  720  0.268  0.443  0  1 
ELECTION YEAR (=1 when the election occurs)  720  0.275  0.447  0  1 
PREVALENCE (percentage of total population who reported having smoked at least 100 cigarettes and who 
currently smoke every day or on some days)  720  22.927  3.055  10.5  32.6 
PCDRIVERS (ratio of licensed drivers to the total population)  720  0.697  0.051  0.569  0.909 
DEMSEN (proportion of state Senate that is Democratic)   705  0.577  0.186  0.086  1 
DEMHOU (proportion of state House that is Democratic)  705  0.574  0.179  0.129  1 
*Figures are based on annual data for continental US states for the year 1992 to 2006, inclusive. All the monetary variables are expressed in real terms, divided by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1982-84 taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. We do not include non continental states (Hawaii, District of Columbia and 
Alaska) and, for DEMSEN and DEMHOU, Nebraska, whose Legislature is unicameral and non-partisan.   23
 
Table 3: Cigarette and Gasoline Tax interdependence (1992-2006): Static Version (2SLS) & Identified through Term Limit 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax 
                 
Wstcigtax  0.5348***  0.5899***  0.5564***  0.5834***         
  (0.1234)  (0.1238)  (0.1185)  (0.1185)         
WstcigtaxTerm_limit      -0.2612***  -0.2732***         
      (0.0839)  (0.0842)         
Wstgastax          0.9492***0.9752***0.7279*** 0.6220** 
          (0.2647)  (0.3215)  (0.2251)  (0.2497) 
WstgastaxTerm_limit              -0.0739  -0.0541 
              (0.0628)  (0.0627) 
Term_limit      41.0463**  43.0300**      11.1292  9.0874 
      (16.3854)  (16.7188)      (7.2510)  (7.1790) 
Demsen  348.8147***323.0290***339.9818***308.2920*** -4.5510  -4.3933  -7.1617  -9.2022 
  (88.2321)  (97.2893)  (86.1142)  (95.5745)  (7.1428)  (7.9833)  (6.6711)  (7.1069) 
Demhou  234.4019** 278.4660*** 230.3912** 280.1435*** 9.4958  8.4144  10.8345  10.2956 
  (99.0836)  (107.7632)  (99.0119)  (107.6053)  (6.8992)  (7.4174)  (6.7507)  (7.0629) 
Governor  -55.5057*** -61.2715*** -52.9047*** -58.3365***  -1.0773  -0.9557  -1.2601*  -1.1646* 
  (10.7941)  (11.3251)  (10.5853)  (11.0703)  (0.7412)  (0.7357)  (0.7239)  (0.7049) 
Prevalence (-1)    0.4832    -1.1606         
    (3.1130)    (3.1004)         
Tobinc  0.0215**  0.0173  0.0231**  0.0214*         
  (0.0109)  (0.0119)  (0.0105)  (0.0115)         
Pcdrivers (-1)            16.8284    19.7453 
            (19.1992)    (18.3958) 
Gasinc          2.2317**  1.9662*  2.7567***  3.0756***
          (0.9955)  (1.1482)  (0.9091)  (1.0053) 
Observations  705  658  705  658  705  658  705  658 
R-squared  0.795  0.800  0.799  0.806  0.908  0.908  0.915  0.918 
























Hansen-test  16.01  18.47  28.78  27.12  58.81  54.43  77.56  72.83 
Hansen-test (p-value)  0.0666  0.0475  0.0922  0.207  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   24
Table 4a: Cigarette Tax interdependence (1992-2006): Dynamic Version (System-GMM//1-Step) & Identified through Term Limit 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax 
                 
Stcigtax (-1)  0.8934***0.8661*** 0.8954***0.8715*** 0.8651*** 0.8513*** 0.8346*** 0.8254*** 
  (0.0479)  (0.0459)  (0.0499)  (0.0472)  (0.0499)  (0.0503)  (0.0550)  (0.0544) 
Wstcigtax  0.1468**  0.1477**  0.1457**  0.1442**  0.1243  0.1161  0.1597*  0.1481* 
  (0.0720)  (0.0686)  (0.0706)  (0.0683)  (0.0775)  (0.0775)  (0.0880)  (0.0877) 
WstcigtaxTerm_limit     -0.0452  -0.0393      -0.1800*  -0.1652* 
      (0.0473)  (0.0474)      (0.0982)  (0.0997) 
Term_limit      3.7427  2.1664      32.6344  29.2924 
      (10.5208)  (10.6107)      (22.4551)  (22.7663) 
Demsen  -23.6658  -45.8031  -23.3198  -45.5729  -22.1072  -41.8206  -16.6164  -35.8036 
  (44.8321)  (43.2338)  (42.2960)  (40.8893)  (45.5800)  (42.4156)  (43.9926)  (41.9888) 
Demhou  42.7273  76.9164*  41.5517  75.3123*  50.8513  80.1218*  49.8619  77.5494* 
  (45.6308)  (43.0791)  (43.6825)  (41.3487)  (45.7228)  (41.7031)  (44.7525)  (41.9254) 
Governor  -14.7940* -17.4648**-14.5947* -17.1366**-16.2768**  -18.3400**-16.6424**-18.5301**
  (7.9282)  (8.2723)  (7.7073)  (8.0211)  (8.1766)  (8.4664)  (8.4060)  (8.6513) 
Prevalence (-1)    -4.2531***   -4.2078***   -4.2490***   -4.2188***
    (1.3776)    (1.3547)    (1.3719)    (1.4769) 
Tobinc  -0.0050  -0.0023  -0.0050  -0.0021  -0.0068  -0.0036  -0.0093**  -0.0059 
  (0.0035)  (0.0030)  (0.0036)  (0.0031)  (0.0042)  (0.0036)  (0.0045)  (0.0040) 
Observations  658  658  658  658  658  658  658  658 
Internal Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
External Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
# Instruments  46  48  59  62  46  47  46  47 
AR(1) (p-value)  3.39e-05  3.41e-05  3.83e-05  3.83e-05  3.06e-05  3.60e-05  4.51e-05  5.14e-05 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.272  0.278  0.299  0.305  0.264  0.272  0.354  0.358 
Hansen-test  29.23  28.49  19.14  17.26  22.08  21.96  17.90  17.61 
Hansen-test (p-value)  0.109  0.160  0.965  0.992  0.395  0.402  0.529  0.549 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   25
Table 4b: Cigarette Tax interdependence (1992-2006): Dynamic Version (System-GMM//2-Step) & Identified through Term Limit 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stcigtax 
                 
Stcigtax (-1)  0.8893***0.8561*** 0.8835***0.8823***0.8689***0.8547*** 0.7927***0.7893***
  (0.0830)  (0.0759)  (0.0617)  (0.0648)  (0.0587)  (0.0588)  (0.0657)  (0.0643) 
Wstcigtax  0.2160*  0.1828*  0.1676**  0.1263*  0.2106**  0.2016**  0.1915**  0.1772** 
  (0.1271)  (0.1105)  (0.0724)  (0.0705)  (0.0918)  (0.0916)  (0.0889)  (0.0882) 
WstcigtaxTerm_limit     -0.0385  -0.0491      -0.1958** -0.1851** 
      (0.0473)  (0.0423)      (0.0866)  (0.0857) 
Term_limit      2.4432  5.6786      28.8235*  27.0191 
      (7.7914)  (7.5756)      (16.4789) (16.4267) 
Demsen  17.9483  -1.9241  -10.7307  -22.3238  -0.7314  -9.9345  -30.3197  -42.2263 
  (68.5034)  (57.1089)  (36.2301) (36.4481) (52.9670)  (46.6572)  (45.9242) (42.9133) 
Demhou  -5.4823  13.1599  5.4638  43.4622  15.3228  40.9624  43.5992  67.7609 
  (73.9103)  (62.2580)  (38.6279) (34.6742) (52.3566)  (46.6329)  (43.1163) (43.2964) 
Governor  -5.9271  -14.4927  -4.3144  -5.7659  -4.6399  -6.5613  -11.3672  -12.1644 
  (11.0922)  (13.1987)  (7.9316)  (8.0997)  (10.9248)  (11.3915)  (9.6250)  (9.6815) 
Prevalence (-1)    -3.8529***   -3.6045**    -3.4233***   -3.1049** 
    (1.4469)    (1.5852)    (1.3048)    (1.5107) 
Tobinc  -0.0010  -0.0006  -0.0054  -0.0003  -0.0026  -0.0000  -0.0068  -0.0040 
  (0.0050)  (0.0042)  (0.0037)  (0.0038)  (0.0041)  (0.0037)  (0.0045)  (0.0038) 
Observations  658  658  658  658  658  658  658  658 
Internal Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
External Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
# Instruments  46  48  59  62  46  47  46  47 
AR(1) (p-value)  6.28e-05  5.06e-05  4.49e-05  4.07e-05  1.84e-05  2.29e-05  4.87e-05  5.14e-05 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.340  0.294  0.261  0.343  0.320  0.332  0.397  0.407 
Hansen-test  29.23  28.49  19.14  17.23  22.08  21.96  17.90  17.61 
Hansen-test (p-value)  0.109  0.160  0.965  0.992  0.395  0.402  0.529  0.549 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   26
Table 5a: Gasoline Tax interdependence (1992-2006): Dynamic Version (System-GMM//1-Step) & Identified through Term Limit 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax 
                 
Stgastax (-1)  0.9497***0.9540***0.9440***0.9476***0.8923***0.8970***0.8982***0.9026***
  (0.0265)  (0.0241)  (0.0258)  (0.0244)  (0.0563)  (0.0626)  (0.0676)  (0.0729) 
Wstgastax  0.1240**  0.1242**  0.1293**  0.1369**  0.2138  0.2038  0.1948  0.1792 
  (0.0538)  (0.0549)  (0.0537)  (0.0562)  (0.1706)  (0.1706)  (0.1781)  (0.1730) 
WstgastaxTerm_limit     0.0152  0.0099      0.1864  0.1771 
      (0.0513)  (0.0509)      (0.1604)  (0.1580) 
Term_limit      -1.0785  -0.4150      -21.1933  -20.0574 
      (5.7654)  (5.7029)      (18.9688) (18.6923) 
Demsen  2.0283  1.9696  1.8268  1.8722  2.4665  2.1748  1.8576  1.4934 
  (2.5580)  (2.6065)  (2.8090)  (2.9184)  (4.3855)  (4.1991)  (4.9983)  (4.7396) 
Demhou  -3.8164  -3.4077  -3.4656  -3.0438  -2.8828  -2.1367  -2.3957  -1.5860 
  (2.8735)  (2.9358)  (3.1358)  (3.2390)  (4.7990)  (4.6349)  (5.2102)  (4.9270) 
Governor  -0.5237  -0.4979  -0.5414  -0.5103  -0.3757  -0.3278  -0.4363  -0.3794 
  (0.4008)  (0.3863)  (0.4247)  (0.4110)  (0.4498)  (0.4190)  (0.5019)  (0.4604) 
Pcdrivers (-1)    9.0851    9.7040    12.4323    12.8705 
    (5.8246)    (5.9324)    (11.7522)    (13.0032) 
Gasinc  -0.2699  -0.3200*  -0.2447  -0.3011  -0.2296  -0.2857  -0.2734  -0.3185 
  (0.1880)  (0.1903)  (0.2035)  (0.2112)  (0.4117)  (0.4553)  (0.4422)  (0.4772) 
Observations  658  658  658  658  658  658  658  658 
Internal Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
External Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
# Instruments  46  48  59  62  46  47  46  47 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.000655  0.000664  0.000631  0.000635  0.00133  0.00157  0.00194  0.00218 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.943  0.948  0.940  0.943  0.950  0.958  0.976  0.983 
Hansen-test  23.50  22.29  16.93  18.05  22.02  22.28  22.55  22.75 
Hansen-test (p-value)  0.318  0.443  0.987  0.989  0.398  0.384  0.258  0.249 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   27
Table 5b: Gasoline Tax interdependence (1992-2006): Dynamic Version (System-GMM//2-Step) & Identified through Term Limit 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax  Stgastax 
                 
Stgastax (-1)  0.9416***0.9572*** 0.9539*** 0.9325***0.9051***0.9007***0.9025***0.8949***
  (0.0373)  (0.0292)  (0.0350)  (0.0295)  (0.0552)  (0.0561)  (0.0850)  (0.0878) 
Wstgastax  0.1184*  0.1059*  0.0797  0.1136**  0.1200  0.1055  0.1934  0.1813 
  (0.0650)  (0.0568)  (0.0522)  (0.0562)  (0.1622)  (0.1586)  (0.1934)  (0.2032) 
WstgastaxTerm_limit     0.0023  0.0177      0.1304  0.1364 
      (0.0497)  (0.0604)      (0.1604)  (0.1508) 
Term_limit      -0.0871  -1.8250      -15.2039  -15.8039 
      (5.5709)  (6.9944)      (19.1097) (17.9893) 
Demsen  0.7931  0.9339  9.5132*  2.1422  0.4163  0.1934  1.6702  0.9744 
  (2.1459)  (2.2588)  (5.3324)  (3.1075)  (3.3309)  (3.2620)  (4.5037)  (4.2493) 
Demhou  -3.3108  -2.9647  -13.8865*** -3.9108  -1.9495  -1.2231  -1.2777  0.0098 
  (2.5754)  (2.4971)  (5.1905)  (2.8135)  (3.8947)  (3.8381)  (5.3606)  (4.8667) 
Governor  -0.4796*  -0.3668  -0.2728  -0.1065  -0.4024  -0.3149  -0.1563  -0.0512 
  (0.2849)  (0.2685)  (0.3266)  (0.3094)  (0.3754)  (0.3175)  (0.5004)  (0.4327) 
Pcdrivers (-1)    11.9500*    13.2554    10.8536    14.2497 
    (6.5660)    (8.3258)    (10.0970)    (15.1099) 
Gasinc  -0.0811  -0.1577  -0.1597  -0.3013  0.0594  0.0914  -0.0907  -0.1109 
  (0.2259)  (0.2173)  (0.2681)  (0.2917)  (0.4473)  (0.4628)  (0.4709)  (0.4869) 
Observations  658  658  658  658  658  658  658  658 
Internal Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
External Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
# Instruments  46  48  59  62  46  47  46  47 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.000781  0.000634  0.000813  0.000942  0.000929  0.000994  0.00129  0.00146 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.945  0.938  0.977  0.996  0.964  0.971  0.949  0.961 
Hansen-test  23.50  22.29  16.93  18.05  22.02  22.28  22.55  22.75 
Hansen-test (p-value)  0.318  0.443  0.987  0.989  0.398  0.384  0.258  0.249 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  28
Table 6: Cigarette and Gasoline Tax interdependence (1992-2006): Dynamic Version (System-
GMM) & Identified through Term Limit and Election Year 
 
 
VARIABLES  Stcigtax  Stcigtax  Stgastax  Stgastax 
  (1-Step)  (2-Steps)  (1-Step)  (2-Steps) 
Stcigtax (-1)  0.8466***  0.8015***     
  (0.0557)  (0.0671)     
Stgastax (-1)      0.8618***0.8826***
      (0.0691)  (0.0802) 
Wstcigtax  0.0583  0.0948     
  (0.0735)  (0.0743)     
WstcitaxTerm_limit  -0.0728  -0.1307     
  (0.1071)  (0.1081)     
WstcigtaxElection_year (-1)  0.4604***  0.4639***     
  (0.1207)  (0.1594)     
WstcigtaxTerm_limitElection_year (-1) -0.7039*  -0.4789     
  (0.4201)  (0.4868)     
Wstgastax      0.1447  0.0584 
      (0.1529)  (0.2189) 
WstgastaxTerm_limit      0.0627  0.1462 
      (0.1313)  (0.1380) 
WstgastaxElection_year (-1)      0.1247  0.1189 
      (0.1569)  (0.2174) 
WstcigtaxTerm_limitElection_year (-1)     -0.2057  -0.4773 
      (0.2981)  (0.4533) 
Election_year (-1)  -113.2105***-108.8296** -14.6473  -13.8766 
  (34.3999)  (44.1678)  (18.9437) (26.1377) 
Term_limit  6.7436  13.9891  -6.6834  -17.1554 
  (22.4970)  (20.5795)  (15.4687) (16.5447) 
Term_limitElection_year (-1)  173.4207*  122.3343  24.6945  57.2881 
  (98.9781)  (113.8869)  (35.6874) (54.9305) 
Demsen  -16.6516  -25.0830  1.7183  -0.4845 
  (37.1430)  (34.1306)  (4.6794)  (5.3951) 
Demhou  60.8605*  73.7368*  -1.6592  -0.0267 
  (35.2575)  (37.9353)  (4.9876)  (6.2726) 
Governor  -18.6483**  -10.9763  -0.1612  0.0595 
  (8.4680)  (8.7039)  (0.4165)  (0.4439) 
Prevalence (-1)  -3.9998***  -3.5111*     
  (1.5192)  (1.8521)     
Tobinc  -0.0058  -0.0058     
  (0.0043)  (0.0041)     
Pcdrivers (-1)      9.0303  7.3420 
      (10.1441) (15.0642) 
Gasinc      -0.0881  0.2366 
      (0.4556)  (0.7017) 
Observations  658  658  658  658 
Internal Instruments  YES  YES  YES  YES 
External Instruments  NO  NO  NO  NO 
# Instruments  48  48  48  48 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.583  0.528  0.862  0.958 
Hansen-test  14.01  14.01  17.33  17.33 
Hansen-test (p-value)  0.598  0.598  0.364  0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
   29
Data Appendix 
 
  tst US cigarette tax rate for state s in year t, divided by the CPI. These rates are 
taken from www.OTPR.org: cigarette tax rates are expressed in US dollars per 
pack of 20 cigarettes and gasoline tax rates are expressed in US dollars per 






st sit w  is the mean tax rates, divided by the CPI, of the states bordering state s 
in year t.  
 
Demographic and socio-economic variables 
 
  POPst is the number of persons in state s in year t. This figure is taken from 
www.census.gov. 
  CHILDst  is the ratio of individuals aged 5-17 years to the total population of 
state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
  AGEDst  is the ratio of individuals over 65 years of age to the total population of 
state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
  UNEMPst is the unemployment rate for state s in year t, taken from 
www.stats.bls.gov. 
  INCst  is the per-capita income for state s in year t divided by the CPI or HPI. 
Income data were taken from http://www.bea.doc.gov. 
  GRANTst is the per-capita federal grant-in-aid for state s in year t. It is obtained 
from "Federal Expenditures by State" which is part of the Consolidated Federal 
Funds Reports program from US Census Bureau. 
  DEMGOVst dummy=1 if the governor of the state is a Republican, taken from 
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
  TERMLIMITst dummy=1 if the governor cannot run for reelection, taken from 
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
  DEMSENst proportion of state Senate that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
  DEMHOUst proportion of state House that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
  CPIt Consumer Price Index was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the 
United States (2000). 
  TOBINCst annual tobacco production (thousand of pounds); from 
http://www.nass.usda.gov, the website of the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service in the USA. 
  GASINCst is the daily gasoline production (thousand barrels per day) per dollar 
of state income in real terms with CPI or HPI; from http://www.eia.doe.gov, the 
website of the Energy Information Administration in the USA. 
  PREVALENCEst is the percentage of persons who reported having smoked at 
least 100 cigarettes and who currently smoke every day or on some days; from 
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/statesystem/TrendReport/TrendReports.aspx, the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 
  PCDRIVERSst is the ratio of licensed drivers to the total population;  from   30
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/, The US Department of Transportation, Federal 
Highway Administration. 